


































overnments that try to pick
winners and losers usually
choose the latter. Some of
the clearest examples of
this come from trade
policy. In the United States and Europe, the
most protected sectors – agriculture,
textiles, clothing, footwear, steel and
shipbuilding – have all been in decline for
decades. Likewise, one of the few policies
of the Bush administration that President
Obama is not breaking with is in keeping
the US car industry alive ‘a high priority’.
Counter-examples are rare. Even when
a growing sector gets protection, as the US
semiconductor industry did, the protection
tends to be focused on market segments –
like memory chips – in which the domestic
industry is losing ground.
There are a few reasons for protecting
‘losers’, two of which may make some
economic sense. The first is that the losers
of today might be the winners of
tomorrow: these ‘infant industries’ need
protection while they mature before they
can successfully compete with the world
leaders. These are industries like
biotechnology or semiconductors, where
accumulated learning and experience are
important drivers of productivity.
But picking potential winners is
difficult in practice. And governments
seem much better at protecting ‘national
champions’ – sunset sectors like Detroit’s
car industry or Italy’s flagship airline,
Alitalia – than dynamic industries. In
contrast, ‘the market does a great job of
rewarding the very best and cutting the
rest down to size’ (Harford, 2008).
A second justification for protecting
losers is one of ‘insurance’ – a desire to
protect the least well-off. But in developed
nations, governments have many policies
for redistributing income and protecting
the worst-off (such as income taxes,
unemployment benefits and retraining
schemes). So we should separate industry
support from considerations of income
distribution. After all, we care about
people not corporations. 
A third intuitive explanation for
protecting losers is the fact that people
care more about ‘known’ individuals than
unidentified ‘faceless’ individuals. Anne
Krueger (1990) contrasts the impact of a
subsidy to a declining sector with one to
an expanding industry: both will alter the
allocation of employment, but in the ailing
industry the jobs ‘saved’ can be identified
with specific people whereas the jobs
created in the expanding sector cannot.
Unlike the first two explanations, this
‘identity bias’ argument has implications
that are much more consistent with
observed government behaviour. Witness,
for example, the asymmetry in press
coverage and government response
(especially in continental Western Europe)
between a factory that shuts down and
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lays off a few hundred workers and the
thousands of jobs being created daily in
dynamic industries that go unnoticed.
But an important criticism of the
identity bias argument is that it does not
explain why certain sectors are more
successful in attracting government
support than others. In the 1980s, the real
wages of US unskilled workers fell
substantially but only a small subset of
these, including apparel workers,
managed to win government support.
Understanding these facts becomes
easier if we take a more cynical view of
the way policies are shaped. In our
research, we use the proliferation of
pressure groups to account for the
surprising amount of support that goes to
declining industries. 
Pressure groups are ubiquitous. 
There are an estimated fifteen to twenty
thousand lobbyists in Brussels. In the
United States in 1999, 3,835 political
action committees were registered and
over eleven thousand general interest
groups, companies and associations
engaged representatives in Washington,
DC (www.opensecrets.org; Grossman and
Helpman, 2001).
Some of the activities of these groups
may be beneficial: they can relay complex
information from experts to legislators and
senior civil servants. But it is also clear that
such groups are equally successful at
bringing home what Americans call ‘pork’.
Our basic story is simple. Government
policy is influenced by pressure groups
who engage in expensive lobbying. Special
interest groups spend money in return for
favours that benefit their bottom line
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994). But
contracting industries have much more to
gain from retaining lobbyists than
expanding industries.
In an expanding industry, a given firm
cannot successfully retain the benefits
from lobbying as new firms will enter the
market and compete away any profitable
opportunities. This is not true in declining
industries. Since there are costs that are
‘sunk’ when a firm enters the market
(such as unrecoverable investments in
product development, training and brand
name advertising), new entrants will not
be able to compete away profitable
opportunities as easily.
The result is that losers lobby harder.
So it is not government policy that picks
losers but rather that losers pick
government policies. This may also explain
why special interest groups fight harder to
avoid losses than they do to win gains.
One key ingredient in our story is that
lobbying is costly. Some sectors might
overcome these costs and organise more
easily than others. In particular, sectors
with only few firms should find it easier to
prevent one firm from ‘free-riding’ on the
lobbying efforts of others than sectors
with a plethora of small firms. Recent US
evidence suggests that all things being
equal, sectors that have few large firms
get more protection than others
(Bombardini, 2008).
The other key ingredient in our story is
that there are entry costs that are 
‘sunk’ and not recoverable on exit. 
When these sunk costs are investments in
human capital, this also explains why
workers with skills specific to ailing
industries lobby harder (for example,
farmers and car workers).
Our analysis sheds light on the
undesirability of packaging protectionist
policies with policies discouraging entry
from competitors (such as a government
monopoly or production quotas). Such
packaging is likely to lead to greater levels
of protection because it increases the
incentives of all industries to lobby 
for protection. 
In addition, when some of the entry
costs are created by regulation and red
tape, special interest groups that manage
to keep such regulations in place need not
be losers. Taxi drivers in the big cities of
the world are an example. How else to
explain how a New York taxi licence hit
the record price of US$600,000 in May
2007? If entry were free, the licence
would be worthless. 
Government policy doesn’t
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While most OECD countries have 
laws prohibiting cartels that prevent 
new production and entry, in certain
industries, such as medicine and law, 
the special interest group itself regulates
the flow of new entrants. In many
countries, the airline industry regulator
and the flagship airline seem to be
indistinguishable in practice.
Unions can play a similar role: those
that are able to control the wages of new
workers benefit from higher tariffs in both
contracting and expanding industries. 
In fact, many countries have sanctioned
‘closed shop’ rules that have had exactly
this effect. France protects its energy
market from foreign competitors (in
violation of European Union rules). In this
case, the unions of its national giant, EDF,
managed to secure wages at a much
higher level than the national average –
that is, to capture a share of the profits
being created by limited entry that usually
accrue to shareholders. 
The recent US ‘cash-for-clunkers’
policy and the government loans to
Chrysler and GM can also be understood
as ultimately helping a key constituency of
the Democrats: the members of the
United Auto Workers union. 
So protectionist packages that place
controls on domestic entry or production
are likely to attract greater lobbying efforts
– which is worse for society as a whole. If
governments refrain from packaging trade
policy with policy that (in effect) regulates
entry, protectionism should be reduced.